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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with the market rental rate for space offered by commercial property and how that 
rental rate evolves over time. Rental rates reflect the value of the services provided by the property and can 
have a significant impact on the ability of its owners to make monthly debt obligations. We investigate 
commercial property rent dynamics for 34 large metropolitan areas in the U.S. The dynamics are studied from 
the second quarter of 1990 through the second quarter of 2009 and the results are compared across four 
property types or uses (office, industrial, flex, and retail). There is substantial heterogeneity in both the long and 
short run responses to changing demand and supply conditions. In general, the office market is the slowest to 
adjust back towards equilibrium while industrial and flex markets adjust back to the long run equilibrium very 
quickly. For industrial and office types, the speed of adjustment is substantially faster within quality segments 
and is strongest for grade A properties. 
Introduction and Motivation 
This paper focuses on the dynamics of rents, or more specifically, the speed at which rents move back to 
equilibrium after a supply or demand shock. We examine this speed of adjustment to see if it is faster or slower 
across different property types (office, retail, etc.), space qualities (grades), magnitude of the disequilibrium, 
and direction of the disequilibrium (too high or too low). 
Most of the prior research about rent dynamics has included only a handful of cities and focused on the office 
property market. The strength of this paper and its contribution to the literature is that it examines four 
different property types for a large cross section of metropolitan areas over a reasonable time period. In 
addition, the paper includes information that covers a broad spectrum of property types ranging from 
institutional quality property to property at the end if its life cycle. The data was collected from Costar summary 
reports for 34 of the 50 of the largest metropolitan areas and includes, at most, the second quarter of 1990 
through the second quarter of 2009.Footnote1 This allows us to compare how different property types react to 
changes in demand and supply conditions in the long run and the speed of adjustment when the market 
deviates from equilibrium. 
Rent dynamics have been studied for many decades, beginning as early as the 1950s when Blank and Winnick 
(1953) developed a model of the relationship between rents and vacancy rates in the housing market. The basic 
concept that unoccupied space should have an impact on the rents landlords can charge was more formally 
tested on local and national US office markets in the 1980s by Shilling et al. (1987) and Wheaton and Torto 
(1988). Using an error correction model of office rents, Hendershott et al. (2002a) identified long run 
relationships and the short run dynamic responses to deviations from equilibrium in the same specification. This 
basic approach has been used in recent papers on office rent dynamics (Brounen and Jennen 2009a; 2009b and 
De Francesco 2008) and is the estimation strategy applied in this research.Footnote2 
The relationships between changing demand and supply conditions and rental rates can differ depending on 
overall economic conditions (for example, expansion versus contraction), the quality of the property, and city 
size (Brounen and Jennen 2009a and b; Slade 2000). For instance, since it can take a long time to build or modify 
an office building, if rents are out of equilibrium due to a supply or demand shock, it may take a long time for 
the supply of space to increase or decrease so that rents return to equilibrium. By contrast, a strip retail mall can 
be built or renovated in a matter of months and, therefore, correction back to the long run equilibrium could be 
faster. The types and lengths of lease contracts may also affect the speed at which a property type or even a 
region returns to equilibrium. 
Consistent with this, the development literature finds that the amount and speed of development is affected by 
the volatility of demand and the extent to which the investment in the development is sunk or irreversible 
(Bulan et al. 2009; Holland et al. 2000; Schwartz and Torous 2007). For example, flex space is partially reversible 
precisely because the use of the space is “flexible”. Typically, the flexibility is limited to class B or C office space 
and warehousing or light industry. Nonetheless, this characteristic makes flex space capable of responding when 
market conditions favor one segment of the commercial market over another. 
There exists theoretical and empirical evidence that rents go down when vacancy rates increase (Wheaton et 
al. 1997) and employment decreases. There is also persistence in rental rates (Brounen and Jennen 2009a, for 
office space). Table 1 summarizes the results of prior papers that are most similar to the approach used in this 
paper (Brounen and Jennen 2009b; Hendershott et al. 2002a; b and 2010). These papers find strong evidence 
that locations with more office-related employment are associated with higher office rents in the long run and 
increases in rents in the short run. Similar results are found for retail space using consumer expenditures as the 
proxy for demand. The evidence on the relationship between rents and the supply of space is not as clear. The 
impact of occupied supply is consistently negative in the long run, though not always significant, and 
insignificant in the short run. For example, Brounen and Jennen (2009a) find a negative impact in the long run 
and a positive impact in the short run for a panel of 15 metropolitan areas in the US using a Torto Wheaton 
Research (TWR) rent index.Footnote3 
Table 1 Results of previous research 






     
 

















Office           
Brounen and 
Jennen, 2009b1 
          
 National premier 
tier 
1.53* −0.34     2.30** −0.19     −0.43* 0.46* 
 Local premier tier 1.45* −0.26     1.32** −0.15     −0.46* 0.46* 
 National second 
tier 
1.12* −0.52*     1.38** 0.12     −0.45* 0.31* 


















          
 London 1.25     −2.78*** 4.20***     0.77 −0.04   
 London with 
lagged rent (sr) 
        2.69**     0.91 −0.19** 0.50** 
 All regions except 
London 




          
 Over the 1977–
1996 period 
3.02***     −5.22*** 2.82***       −1.30 −0.86*** 
 Over the 1977–
2006 period 

















          
 London 1.58***     −3.48*** 1.55***     −3.54* −0.36*   
 London with 
lagged rent (sr) 
        0.98**     −3.10** −0.46** 0.43*** 
 All regions except 
London 
1.11***     −0.74*** 1.46***     −0.53** −0.23***   
1Brounen and Jennen (2009b) use annual office market data for the two most important cities in five European countries, distinguishing between 
premier tier office (London, Madrid, Frankfurt, Paris, and Amsterdam) and second tier office (Glasgow, Barcelona, Düsseldorf, Lyon, and Rotterdam). 
Their demand driver is FTE (full-time equivalent) employment service industry. 2 Hendershott et al. (2002a) employ annual City of London office market 
data. Their demand driver is employment. 3 Hendershott et al. (2002b) study a 29 years period for ten regions in the UK plus London. Their demand 
drivers are Finance & business services employment for office and Consumers Expenditure for retail. 4 Hendershott et al. (2010) focus on the City of 
London office markets and include a lagged level of vacancy rates. Here we report the estimation results for the symmetric rent models. “Emlpoy” 
stands for employment and “consum expend” stands for consumer expenditure. *s indicate statistical significance of the coefficient estimate: * for 10%, 
** for 5%, and *** for 1% 
 
Hendershott et al. (2002b) conclude that the demand elasticities for retail and office spaces are similar in the 
United Kingdom. Furthermore, they find no significant difference between North and South in terms of growth 
regions, although they do find what they call the “London effect”, that is, the demand elasticity for space with 
respect to both price (rent) and income are much lower in magnitude in London than in the rest of the United 
Kingdom. 
Brounen and Jennen (2009a) extend the analysis by testing asymmetry in rent response to positive changes in 
office employment. Positive office employment changes have a significantly higher impact on rents when 
occupancy is elevated (vacancy rates below the long-term mean). Additionally, they find a very slow error 
correction. Within a year, only about 4.5% of the disequilibrium in rents is restored. 
Englund et al. (2008) introduce the concept of “hidden vacancies” – unobservable deviations of the occupied 
space from the current demand, which are a temporary consequence of the rigidities in the market and can be 
positive or negative. The market refers to this as the sublet market for space. Hence, occupied space does not 
represent the actual demand for space. Hidden vacancies refer to that space that is currently occupied only 
because of moving/transaction costs and stable lease terms, but would be vacant (“open vacancies”) otherwise. 
If the renter enjoys an historic (previously set) rental rate that is lower than the current market rate, due to 
multi-period lease contracts, the space could have been vacant had the contract been updated. Information 
from Costar indicates that this issue may be more important in office property than in retail property.Footnote4 
The remainder of the paper reviews the error correction empirical model, presents the data, introduces the 
empirical results, and provides a discussion of the results and conclusion. 
The Hendershott and Coauthors Error Correction Model 
Hendershott et al. (2002b) observed that the prior literature modeled the property market through either a 
reduced form demand-supply equation, identified as the European style, or an equilibrium-based rental 
adjustment equation, identified as the US style. They combine both of these approaches or styles in an error 
correction model (ECM), which takes into account dynamics and long term trends of the property markets. 
Starting from the long run equilibrium relationships, one can use the error term from this original specification 
to proxy for the disequilibrium responses. This proxy is called an error correction term and is subsequently 
lagged and included in the short run or differenced model to account for how far from equilibrium the market is. 
We present an ECM of commercial property rents following Hendershott et al. (2002b) and the literature that 
follows (Brounen and Jennen 2009a and b and De Francesco 2008).Footnote5 The demand for space (D) can be 
modeled as a function of rents (R) along with the economic activity (E) in a Cobb-Douglas function: 
𝐷𝐷 = 𝜆𝜆0𝑅𝑅𝜆𝜆1𝐸𝐸𝜆𝜆2 (1) 
The “price” (rent) elasticity (λ1) is expected to be negative, while the income elasticity (λ2) should be positive. 
The occupied supply of space (OS) can be expressed as the product of the supply of available office space (s) and 
the occupancy rate, (1-v), in which v stands for vacancy rate. 
𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 = (1 − 𝑣𝑣)𝑠𝑠 (2) 
By definition, the demand of space equals the occupied supply of space: 
𝐷𝐷(𝑅𝑅,𝐸𝐸) ≡ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂(𝑣𝑣, 𝑠𝑠) (3) 
Taking logs on both sides of the equation and solving for the log of rent gives the reduced-form long run model: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[(1 − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) × 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
This equation shows long run price (rent) as a reflection of supply and demand. The i subscript identifies the 
metropolitan area or cross section, while the t subscript stands for time and denotes the observation for the 
particular panel. Here, u it is the error term. The implied price and income elasticity are λ1 = 1/β 2 and λ2 = 
−β 1 /β 2 , respectively. Under this specification, rents are associated with contemporaneous demand and supply 
variables. The contemporaneous vacancy rate is likely to be endogenous, as higher unemployment leads to 
lower commercial occupancies and declining rents. Following Grenadier (2005) and Brounen and Jennen 
(2009b), we estimate the vacancy rate, v^v^, from a simple autoregression model. We choose the optimal lag 
order according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistics for each metropolitan area and each property 
type. 
For the price and income elasticity to be of correct sign in the long run model, the coefficient on occupied space 
must be negative. This implies that higher vacancy rates, which must decrease the amount of occupied 
space, ((1 − 𝑣𝑣
^
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) × 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), should be associated with higher rent rates. This relationship seems problematic. One 
approach taken in the literature is to break occupied space or supply into its two components, the occupancy 
rate and total space. 
Due to inconsistent empirical results in the literature and in this paper’s results we will test a variety of proxies 
for supply. First, we test the supply specification using occupied space, then separate vacancy and the supply of 
space, and lastly only include space (both occupied and unoccupied) as the measure of supply. In fact, since 
vacancy reflects the interaction of supply and demand conditions it is neither a proxy for supply nor a proxy for 
demand. 
The ECM requires the variables in the level equation to be cointegrated, or the error correction term to be 
stationary. Taking differences of the level equation and adding the error correction term yields the short run 
rent adjustment model: 
Δ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1Δ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2Δ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙[(1 − 𝑣𝑣
^
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) × 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] + 𝛼𝛼3𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝛼𝛼4Δ𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖(𝑖𝑖−1) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
Here Δ is the differencing operator, such that Δy i,t   = y i,t – y i,t-1 , u i(t-1) is the error-correction term estimated 
from the long run model, and ε it is the error term. The ECM requires the variables in the level equation to be 
cointegrated, or the error correction term to be stationary, so we perform unit root test on the error term as a 
preliminary step. The rents adjust to short run changes in the state of the economy, the vacancy rate, the supply 
of space, deviations of rents from their long run values (error correction term or lagged error term from the long 
run model), and the lagged rent changes. The lagged endogenous variable, ΔlnR (t-1) , allows for partial short run 
adjustment in the rents or sticky rents (De Wit and Van Dijk 2003). Assuming that there is no drift in 
rents, α 0 should be zero. If rents are sticky, then changes in demand, measured by employment or sales, should 
lead to an increase in rents. The impact of changes in occupied stock is indeterminate. The coefficient on the 
error correction model is expected to be negative, and it indicates whether there is no adjustment (α 3  = 0), 
partial adjustment (− 1 < α 3  < 0), complete adjustment (α 3  = − 1), or over-adjustment (α 3  < − 1). 
Data 
Demand drivers considered by the literature include consumer expenditures, industry-specific employment and 
output (for example, for financial and business services or manufacturing), unemployment rate, value added of 
office-related industries, and gross domestic product (Hendershott et al. 2002a and b; De Francesco 2008; 
Brounen and Jennen 2009a and b). In this paper we use property type and metro area specific 
employment.Footnote6 For retail space, we include national retail sales as a proxy for economic activity. Sales, in 
trillions, for each property type are from the Monthly Retail Trade Survey, reported by the U.S. Census 
Bureau.Footnote7 
Table 2 describes the variables. Average asking rents and vacancy rates for each metropolitan area and property 
type are obtained from CoStar quarterly summary reports. Office rents are reported as full-service or gross, 
while retail, flex, and industrial rents are reported as NNN.Footnote8 Costar is one of the largest providers of 
commercial real estate information to the market place. Costar reports that the database contains more than 77 
billion square feet of inventory, 1.5 million listings, and 10.6 million images of the property. The primary client 
for Costar is commercial brokers. Costar collects its information by asking property owners, brokers, and local 
government officials for information describing the building and the lease that is being marketed. Individuals can 
enter a listing onto the system and Costar independently verifies the listing. Costar is not compensated based on 
successful transactions. While not identical, Costar does resemble the single family market multiple listing 
service run by the National Association of Realtors. However, Costar is a for profit company listed on NASDAQ 
with a ticker of CSGP. 
Table 2 Description of variables 
Variable Description 
R Real rent (in 1990 constant dollars) per square foot per year for each metropolitan area (as defined 
by the metropolitan area Core Based Statistical Area, CBSA) and property type. Rent is defined as 
the total average rate of asking rents for the CBSA and property type. Real rent series is obtained 
by dividing nominal rent values by the price index (year 1990) for that same time period set price 
indexes equal to 100 in a given base year. ∆R is the growth rate of real rent quarter to quarter (for 
example, a 5% increase is expressed as 0.05) for each CBSA and property type. Source: CoStar 
(Nominal Rent) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (Consumer Price Index, CPI). 




 Estimated vacancy rate from an autoregression model. The lag length is determined by the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) statistics for each CBSA and each property type. Source: CoStar and 
author calculations. 
s Square feet of available space (supply) or rentable building area (RBA) in each quarter for each 
CBSA and property type. The total square footage of the buildings that can be occupied by, or 
assigned to a tenant for the purpose of determining a tenant’s rental obligation. Generally, RBA 
includes a percentage of common areas including all hallways, main lobbies, bathrooms, and 
telephone closets.  
Source: CoStar. 
Q Sales, in trillions of dollars, seasonally adjusted for each property type. Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
E All Employees, in thousands, uniformly weighted moving average including 3 lagged terms and the 
current observation, for each CBSA and property type. Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
author calculations. 
 
Like most data sets, Costar data is not perfect, but it does provide a unique view of commercial property 
because it is not limited to investment grade property (it includes anyone marketing property). It is available for 
“top tier” cities on the coast such as Washington DC and Los Angeles as well as smaller Midwest markets such as 
Columbus OH and southern areas such as Memphis TN. As a result, there is a lot of cross sectional variation in 
the data set and many of the properties are of lower quality. For example, the average size of industrial property 
in the estimation data set is approximately 41,500 square feet. If the data is separated into different grades, 
grade A industrial property is on average 172,352 square feet and grades B and C are respectively 62,858 and 
29,569. This is evidence that the Costar data provides very broad coverage in market segments that are less 
likely to be of interest to institutional investors but are still important parts of the property market. 
While the Costar data provides broad market coverage, it does not come without some limitations. A study of 
rent dynamics would ideally use a constant quality rent series and the rent series should reflect the true cost of 
renting. Relative to constant quality rents, average rents should tend to rise as the quality on average improves 
and decrease as the average quality deteriorates. If property quality is pro-cyclical then this should increase the 
volatility of the average rent series. To estimate the effective or true rent from a lease, the length of the lease, 
any incentives given to the tenant to move in (lower cost tenant improvements, first month free, etc.…), the 
nature of expense reimbursements, and any future changes in the rental rate must all be known.Footnote9 This is a 
very detailed and difficult task that requires projections of indexes and property specific operating expenses. 
Costar summary quarterly reports do not report this information. Therefore, asking rents are likely to be 
smoother than effective rents because concessions tend to be more frequent when the market is in 
decline.Footnote10 
Upon examination of the rent and vacancy time series, it became clear that when a new metropolitan area is 
added to the Costar data series the initial data are often extremely volatile. This may be attributable to survey 
start up issues. Therefore, for most metropolitan areas the first few observations are removed from the sample. 
Table 3 reports the time period when the rent data is available by metropolitan area and property type. 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for each property type of the data set used in this analysis. The data covers 
thirty-four metropolitan areas for at most a period of 1990:Q2 through 2009:Q2, and is classified by property 
type (office, retail, industrial and flex). 
Table 3 Data availability by metropolitan area and property type 
Metropolitan area Office Retail Industrial Flexible 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 1990q2 2001q2 1992q2 1992q2 
Austin-Round Rock, TX 2002q2 2001q2 2001q1 2002q2 
Baltimore-Towson, MD 1999q2 2001q2 1994q2 1994q2 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 2000q4 2001q2 2000q2 2000q2 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 1999q2 2001q2 1996q3 1996q3 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 2000q2 2001q2 2000q2 2000q2 
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 2000q2 2001q2 2000q2 2000q2 
Columbus, OH 2000q2 2001q2 2000q2 2000q2 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 2000q1 2001q2 1996q2 1996q2 
Denver-Aurora, CO N/A N/A N/A 2000q2 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 2000q3 2001q2 2000q2 2000q3 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 1999q2 2001q2 1999q2 1999q2 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 2000q4 2001q2 2000q4 2001q4 
Jacksonville, FL 2000q1 2001q2 2000q1 2000q1 
Kansas City, MO-KS 2000q4 2001q2 2000q4 2000q4 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 1997q2 2001q2 1998q1 1997q1 
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 2000q2 2001q2 2000q2 2002q2 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 1999q4 2001q3 1999q4 1999q4 
Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 2001q1 2001q2 2003q2 2001q1 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 1996q4 N/A 1996q4 1996q4 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 2000q3 2001q2 2000q3 2000q2 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 1997q4 2001q2 1997q4 1997q4 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 1999q2 2001q2 1999q2 1999q4 
Pittsburgh, PA 2000q4 2001q2 2000q4 2000q4 
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 2003q2 2003q2 2003q2 2003q3 
Raleigh-Cary, NC 2002q2 2001q2 2000q4 2000q4 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 1999q2 2001q2 1998q2 1999q2 
Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville, CA 1999q1 2001q2 2001q3 1999q2 
St. Louis, MO-IL 2000q2 2001q2 2000q3 2001q2 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 1999q3 2001q2 1999q3 1999q3 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1999q3 2001q2 1997q2 1997q3 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 2002q2 2001q2 2000q2 2000q3 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 1999q4 2001q2 2000q2 1999q4 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 1994q1 2001q2 1993q3 1993q3 
All data continues to 2009q2. N/A indicates the data is not available. The metropolitan area is defined as Core 
Based Statistical Area, CBSA 
Table 4 Summary statistics by property type 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Office Date: 1990q2–2009q2      
 Real Rent 1310 14.18 3.38 8.74 37.88 
 Office Employment 1310 1,025.02 983.53 227.30 5,228.90 
 Vacancy 1310 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.20 
Retail Date: 2001q2–2009q2      
 Real Rent 1047 9.89 3.32 2.02 35.11 
 Real Retail Sales 1047 587,462.40 36,508.62 509,415.60 649,210.80 
 Retail Employment 1047 175.47 116.79 50.00 626.30 
 Vacancy 1047 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.12 
Industrial Date: 1992q2–2009q2      
 Real Rent 1398 3.31 1.11 1.48 12.97 
 Industrial Employment 1398 180.50 170.11 29.60 885.60 
 Vacancy 1398 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.16 
Flexible Date: 1992q2–2009q2      
 Real Rent 1392 6.39 1.95 2.93 24.25 
 Flexible Employment 1392 1,203.38 1,104.15 260.40 5,671.00 
 Vacancy 1392 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.27 
Obs is the number of observations. Std. Dev. stands for standard deviation 
 
Figure 1 depicts national average rents for our sample of 34 metropolitan areas. The rents are compared to the 
vacancy rate, sales and the change in the natural log of employment. The figure indicates that when office 
vacancy rates were low and office-based employment was growing, real rents were increasing. It is of some 
interest that when employment was declining and vacancy rates were increasing very quickly in 2008, rents had 
not yet started declining. This may reflect the relative slowness with which the office market can react to 
changing economic conditions due to the long-term nature of most office leases and more frequent use of the 
sublet market. For retail property it is difficult to see any obvious cycles. However, sales and rents seem to move 
together over time. Rents rise steadily through the mid 2000s and stabilize in 2007 despite consistently 
increasing vacancy rates. In the industrial market vacancy rates and employment growth move almost in 
synchronicity, but employment has been in decline through most of the 2000s leading to almost a 50% 
reduction in industrial rents. Similar to the industrial market, the flex market experienced strong rental growth 
in the 1990s but substantial erosion in the 2000s. 
 
Fig. 1 Aggregate time series by property type. National averages, aggregated from CBSA level data. To scale it for 
graphical purposes Vacancy is multiplied by 100 to express as a percentage and Sales is divided by 1,000 
 
Since asking rental rates are likely to be smoother than effective rents, it might be useful to compare the Costar 
asking rent changes to TWR rent changes.Footnote11 For office property, rents declined approximately 4, 7, and 7% 
per year in 2001 through 2003 for the TWR index. Nominal Costar asking rents declined 1, 4, and 5% for the 
same time period. For industrial property, TWR rents are estimated to decline by 1, 3, and 3% in 2001, 2002, and 
2003. Nominal Costar asking rents decline 7, 4, and 4% over the same time periods. Therefore, while there may 
be some smoothing of the Costar asking rents they do follow the same general pattern as the TWR modeled 
rents and sometimes decrease more and other times decrease less.Footnote12 
The figures reinforce the important relationships between rents, vacancy and economic activity. In general and 
not surprisingly, rent appreciation seems to be associated with lower vacancy rates and growing employment. 
Similar associations are found for office, retail, industrial, and flex property types. 
Empirical Results 
Pooled Results 
Panel I of Tables 5 and 6 report the results from estimating Eqs. 4 and 5 for each property type. A measure of 
metropolitan area economic activity (EA) is included in each specification as the proxy for demand. For office, 
industrial, and flex space, industry specific employment is used as the proxy. For retail space, national retail sales 
are used as the demand proxy. Occupied space, ln[(1 − 𝑣𝑣
^
) × 𝑠𝑠], is calculated using a fitted vacancy rate, 𝑣𝑣
^
, and 
all (occupied and unoccupied) space, s. The fitted values (𝑣𝑣
^
) of vacancy rates are estimated in a separate 
autoregressive model for each metropolitan area. Based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) statistics for 
each metropolitan area and each property type, the optimal lag order for vacancy rate is one or two lags in most 
cases, with some exceptions at three, four and five lags. 
Table 5 Pooled long run results 
 
Office Retail Industrial Flex 
I. Occupied space     
 ln(EA) 0.290 0.722** 0.498*** 1.310*  
(0.882) (0.289) (0.155) (0.667) 
 ln[(1– 𝑣𝑣
^
) × s] −0.408 1.178*** 0.191 −0.341  
(0.925) (0.370) (0.162) (0.403) 
 R 2 -adj 0.809 0.746 0.893 0.742 
 N 1310 1047 1398 1392 
Wooldridge 184.063 95.945 20.658 69.285 
II. Vacancy rate and space separated     
 ln(EA) 0.189 0.156 0.347** 1.322**  
(0.652) (0.200) (0.137) (0.585) 
 ln(𝑣𝑣
^
) −0.161*** 0.092 −0.150*** −0.079  
(0.039) (0.060) (0.033) (0.048) 
 ln(s) −0.269 0.443 0.106 −0.459  
(0.656) (0.409) (0.136) (0.421) 
 R 2 -adj 0.846 0.763 0.900 0.755 
 N 1310 1047 1398 1392 
 Wooldridge 230.206 86.039 20.723 71.623 
III. No vacancy rate     
 ln(EA) 0.896 0.491* 0.492*** 1.572**  
(0.602) (0.240) (0.164) (0.614) 
 ln(s) −1.113* 1.045*** 0.108 −0.699  
(0.609) (0.268) (0.155) (0.459) 
 R 2 -adj 0.833 0.754 0.893 0.752 
 N 1310 1047 1398 1392 
 Wooldridge 237.399 90.981 20.661 71.961 
This table reports the results from the error correction model of different property types’ rents (R) for 33 
(office), 32 (retail), or 34 (industrial, flex) CBSAs, considering all quality grades (A, B and C). All models are 
measured including a constant term and binary variables for each metropolitan area (estimated coefficients not 
shown), omitting Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marriett, GA. The dependent variable is ln(R) and ∆ln(R) for long and 
short run models, respectively. R stands for real rent, EA is sector specific employment for office, industrial, and 
flex property types and retail sales for the retail property type, 𝑣𝑣
^
 is the fitted vacancy rate, and s is the sector 
specific stock of space. N is the number of observations. Wooldridge is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data. In all cases, the p-value is 0.000, so the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected. 
Robust standard error (adjusted for clusters in CBSA) statistics appear in parenthesis. *p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, 
***p = 0.01 
Table 6 Pooled short run results 
 
Office Retail Industrial Flex 
I. Occupied space     
 ∆ ln(EA) 0.942** 0.322** 0.615 1.795**  
(0.411) (0.137) (0.369) (0.773) 
 ∆ ln[(1 – 𝑣𝑣
^
) × s] 0.100 0.092 −0.304 −0.284  
(0.126) (0.337) (0.256) (0.212) 
 u (t-1) −0.038*** −0.156*** −0.194*** −0.169***  
(0.006) (0.018) (0.040) (0.043) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1) 0.222*** −0.089* −0.096* 0.049 
 
(0.054) (0.046) (0.051) (0.054) 
 R 2 -adj 0.151 0.111 0.117 0.101 
 N 1277 1015 1364 1358 
 Wooldridge 40.805 162.951 29.059 66.620 
II. Vacancy rate and space separated     
 ∆ ln(EA) 0.618* 0.314** 0.437 1.254*  
(0.319) (0.134) (0.331) (0.650) 
 ln(𝑣𝑣
^
) 0.017* −0.003 0.022 0.009  
(0.009) (0.052) (0.028) (0.010) 
 ln(s) 0.496*** 0.073 0.031 −0.009  
(0.182) (0.314) (0.467) (0.464) 
 u (t-1) −0.093*** −0.166*** −0.228*** −0.194***  
(0.008) (0.017) (0.043) (0.034) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1) 0.184*** −0.087* −0.090* 0.053  
(0.049) (0.045) (0.049) (0.054) 
 R 2 -adj 0.213 0.115 0.141 0.120 
 N 1277 1015 1364 1358 
 Wooldridge 105.986 149.432 29.675 74.232 
III. No vacancy rate     
 ∆ ln(EA) 0.781* 0.350** 0.524 1.394*  
(0.388) (0.137) (0.386) (0.723) 
 ∆ ln(s) 0.336 0.099 0.161 −0.011  
(0.216) (0.311) (0.471) (0.470) 
 u (t-1) −0.062*** −0.160*** −0.191*** −0.184***  
(0.009) (0.019) (0.040) (0.037) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1) 0.212*** −0.088* −0.099* 0.052  
(0.059) (0.046) (0.052) (0.054) 
 R 2 -adj 0.171 0.113 0.115 0.112 
 N 1277 1015 1364 1358 
 Wooldridge 62.781 169.217 28.211 71.045 
This table reports the results from the error correction model of different property types’ rents (R) for 33 
(office), 32 (retail), or 34 (industrial, flex) CBSAs, considering all quality grades (A, B and C). All models are 
measured including a constant term and binary variables for each metropolitan area (estimated coefficients not 
shown), omitting Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marriett, GA. The dependent variable is ln(R) and ∆ln(R) for long and 
short run models, respectively. R stands for real rent, EA is sector specific employment for office, industrial, and 
flex property types and retail sales for the retail property type, v^v^ is the fitted vacancy rate, and s is the sector 
specific stock of space. N is the number of observations. Wooldridge is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data. In all cases, the p-value is 0.000, so the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected. 
Robust standard error (adjusted for clusters in CBSA) statistics appear in parenthesis. *p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, 
***p = 0.01 
Panel I of Table 5 shows the result for the long run rent model. Both the short run and long run equations are 
pooled across all available metropolitan areas. Hausman tests reveal that fixed effects are preferred in almost all 
specifications. To ease comparison of the results across different subsamples, all pooled estimates are reported 
use fixed effects.Footnote13 We test for the stationarity of u t using augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The lag 
order for the ADF tests is determined by the AIC statistics. In each case, we find at least one panel is stationary, 
suggesting the variables in the level equation are cointegrated.Footnote14 The explanatory power of the long run 
model is much higher than the short run model. For example, in Table 5 panel I adjusted R2s range from 0.74 for 
flex space to 0.89 for industrial space in the long run model, but only 0.10 for flex space and 0.15 for office space 
in the short run model (panel I of Table 6). This stands to reason because the long-term nature of commercial 
leases makes rents stickier than employment or sales data. 
As expected, the Wooldridge (2002) statistic, which is designed for panel data with fixed effects, indicates 
autocorrelation in the error term for the long run and short run models (Drukker 2003). However, we relax the 
assumption of independence of observations and use the Huber and White sandwich estimator (sometimes 
referred to as the clustered or Rogers standard errors) of variance. This approach adjusts the standard errors to 
reflect the fact that we have repeated observations from one location -- these repeated observations are likely 
to be correlated with each other and therefore provide less information than independent observations. This 
approach is designed to correct for the correlation of the residuals within each metropolitan area. There is 
evidence that two frequently used techniques to resolve this problem, Fama-MacBeth and Newey-West, have 
standard errors that are biased downward in a panel setting and that the Rogers or clustered standard errors are 
preferred (Petersen 2009). Therefore, while the Wooldridge statistics suggested a correlation problem within 
each metropolitan area, which would bias the standard errors, the clustering technique helps to mitigate this 
problem. 
Economic activity, ln(EA), whether measured by sector specific employment or consumer expenditures, is 
always positively associated with higher rents in the long run and almost always positively associated in the 
short run. The precision of the results varies across property types; office space typically has the least precise 
results. Consistent with the prior literature, occupied space, ln[(1 – v^v^) × s], is statistically insignificant for 
three of the four property types in the long run model and insignificant for all four property types in the short 
run model. 
While the results are generally consistent with the prior literature, there are substantial differences in the 
results across property types. For example, among the four property types, in the long run, rents for flex space 
are the most sensitive to changing economic activity. This may reflect the unique attributes of flex property. For 
example, while flex property has many of the characteristics of industrial property, rents are much higher 
(almost twice as high in our data). The building is typically a big box and most of the time, at least in the Costar 
database, the use of the property is for warehouse whether the property is identified as flex or industrial. Flex 
space can also include a showroom or office space, which can be used for the selling goods and services and 
administration activities. Since customers, whether businesses or consumers, are more likely to visit the 
location, it makes sense that flex property is considered to be a little nicer with a few more amenities 
(landscaping and more appealing exterior). 
The coefficient on the lagged change in rents, ∆ln(R)t-1, indicates that there is substantially more persistence in 
short run changes in office rents than in the other property type rents. However, the lack of precision in the long 
run office results engenders some skepticism regarding the short run results. For retail and industrial space, 
increasing rents in one quarter are associated with a decrease in rents in the next quarter. 
Different property types return to equilibrium at substantially different speeds. The coefficient on the error 
correction term, u t-1, in Table 6 panel I indicates this speed. Retail, industrial, and flex property all move back to 
equilibrium at approximately the same rate, 16 to 19% per quarter, but office property returns to equilibrium at 
a much slower rate of just under 4% per quarter. Unfortunately, the prior literature provides little guidance on 
the expected speed of adjustment since it reports annual error corrections ranging from about 95% to almost 
zero for office property. The slower adjustment of office property seems consistent with a property type that 
can take a long time to build and has long lease terms. Downtown office property can take 3 to 8 years to obtain 
approvals, financing, and construction which can make it slow to respond to demand shocks and prior supply 
shocks. In addition, the use of concessions may slow the speed at which rents appear to move back to 
equilibrium. For retail, industrial, and flex property types, our results indicate that over the course of 1 year the 
majority of the disequilibrium is corrected. Again, this result, a faster adjustment back to equilibrium, seems 
reasonable because these property types are usually fairly simple structures with much of the interior design 
customized for the individual tenant. 
Panel II in Tables 5 and 6 adjusts the specification and breaks occupied space into its two components—the 
vacancy rate, 𝑣𝑣
^
, and total space (both occupied and unoccupied) in the market, s. All the specifications are 
estimated with fixed effects. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as within group results and each 
variable is effectively mean deleted at the metropolitan area. If the prior results are miss-specified, we should 
expect higher vacancy rates to have a negative impact on rents. The results find evidence of this in the office 
space market and industrial space market, but not in retail or flex space markets. Again, vacancy and the supply 
of space results are inconsistent and largely insignificant in the short run model. 
Panel III in Tables 5 and 6 continues with a pooled approach but does not include the vacancy rate. With fixed 
effects, a high vacancy rate indicates that the rate is high for the area over the time period studied, not whether 
it is above or below an equilibrium rate or higher or lower than other areas. This limits the applicability of the 
vacancy coefficient. In addition, by definition, vacancy rates reflect the interaction of demand conditions (the 
amount of space demanded) and supply conditions (the amount of space provided). However, the spirit of this 
paper is to identify supply and demand through reasonable proxies. A reasonable proxy for supply is the square 
feet of space supplied and a reasonable proxy for demand is economic activity. These are the proxies included in 
panel III. The results, as compared to panel II, show a larger demand effect and an increase in precision in the 
long run models for all property types. In terms of supply, the coefficient for office space is negative, as 
expected, and significant at the 10% level. However, supply is positive and significant for retail space and 
insignificant for industrial and flex. The short run model shows very similar patterns of error correction, or speed 
of adjustment, and responses to changing economic activity and supply conditions as found earlier. 
De-Pooling the Long Run Model and Heterogeneity 
This section examines one possible type of the heterogeneity—location. The pooled long run results largely 
meet expectations that more demand is associated with higher rents in the long run and the rents do not adjust 
instantaneously. However, there is a lack of precision in the results. In addition, while office property has the 
expected persistence in rent changes, both retail and industrial rents had negative persistence. This 
characteristic of oscillating short run rents on a quarterly basis seems unrealistic and may just indicate random 
noise. There may be many reasons for this lack of precision including data quality, measurement error, location, 
city size, declining or increasing rents, property quality, or just too short a time period to identify the long run. 
All the prior tests in this paper have estimated the long run relationships by assuming that demand and supply 
have the same impact in all metropolitan areas. Yet each area has its own institutional, geographical, and 
economic history that is likely to affect the relationship between rents and supply and demand conditions. For 
instance, it seems unlikely that the marginal impact of lower levels of office related employment in Detroit will 
be the same as in Dallas. Therefore, we estimate the long run relationship using the specification in panel III of 
Tables 5 and 6 separately for each metropolitan area. 
This approach is cumbersome and creates a lot of long run results. Therefore, we try to summarize the results. 
The adjusted R2s are on average from 42% to 60% across the four property types with considerable variation 
across areas. Table 7 reports the coefficient and standard error for the effect of economic activity for each 
property type.Footnote15 Again, there is considerable heterogeneity across property types and metropolitan areas. 
For example, consistent with the pooled results, for office property economic activity has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on rents in the long run for 17 of the areas, but for 11 areas there is a negative and 
statistically significant impact. For retail, industrial, and flex property the ratio of positive to negative and 
statistically significant impacts are 16/4, 26/3 and 18/3. Therefore, the impact of economic activity meets 
expectations more often in these property types. 
Table 7 Results for demand (ln EA), long-run model, by metropolitan area 
Metropolitan area Office Retail Industrial Flex 
Atlanta −0.401* 0.630*** 1.962*** 0.059  
(0.217) (0.190) (0.181) (0.474) 
Austin 1.457** −0.074 0.587** 1.074  
(0.58) (0.152) (0.219) (0.737) 
Baltimore 2.742*** 0.217 0.796*** 3.470***  
(0.352) (0.159) (0.127) (0.759) 
Charlotte 0.355* −1.224*** 1.752*** 3.906***  
(0.189) (0.414) (0.178) (0.396) 
Chicago −1.070*** −0.889*** 0.859*** 5.904***  
(0.270) (0.271) (0.158) (0.846) 
Cincinnati 0.882* 0.896* 1.141*** −3.036  
(0.472) (0.455) (0.173) (2.262) 
Cleveland −4.603*** 0.561** 0.481*** 1.888  
(0.817) (0.205) (0.047) (2.233) 
Columbus −2.323*** −0.445 1.044*** 1.024  
(0.216) (0.302) (0.170) (0.647) 
Dallas 1.510*** −1.417*** 0.716*** 0.484  
(0.158) (0.345) (0.208) (0.564) 
Denver – – 0.227 1.606***  
    (0.282) (0.310) 
Detroit 0.500*** 2.161*** 0.603*** 2.530***  
(0.156) (0.298) (0.125) (0.461) 
Houston 1.675*** 1.023*** 1.344*** −4.576***  
(0.432) (0.243) (0.444) (0.482) 
Indianapolis −0.541 0.074 1.206* −2.810  
(0.515) (0.176) (0.647) (2.128) 
Jacksonville −0.220 3.274*** 1.458*** 0.397  
(0.204) (0.78) (0.216) (1.236) 
Kansas City 0.734*** 0.265** 0.611 1.390***  
(0.234) (0.129) (0.657) (0.437) 
Los Angeles 2.248*** 0.805*** 0.536*** 1.549**  
(0.296) (0.113) (0.134) (0.622) 
Memphis −1.062*** −0.529 0.795 −7.364***  
(0.232) (0.432) (0.483) (1.806) 
Miami −0.651** 0.647*** 0.795*** −0.316  
(0.259) (0.121) (0.176) (0.863) 
Nashville −1.628*** −1.166*** 0.634* −0.821 
 
(0.368) (0.279) (0.353) (1.058) 
New York 2.869*** – 1.522*** 1.228  
(0.371)   (0.177) (1.971) 
Orlando −0.069 0.062 1.129*** 4.033***  
(0.248) (0.282) (0.224) (0.497) 
Philadelphia 0.831 0.546** 0.262* −9.846***  
(0.930) (0.235) (0.142) (1.754) 
Phoenix 0.987*** 1.357*** 0.053 1.365***  
(0.311) (0.286) (0.293) (0.332) 
Pittsburgh −1.020*** −0.169 −0.516*** 2.253**  
(0.354) (0.205) (0.147) (1.03) 
Portland −0.425 0.069 −0.444** −0.805  
(0.328) (0.137) (0.197) (0.705) 
Raleigh −0.772** 0.266 1.030*** 0.668*  
(0.306) (0.455) (0.142) (0.371) 
Riverside 0.947*** 0.728** 0.682*** 1.358***  
(0.122) (0.285) (0.203) (0.461) 
Sacramento 1.186*** 1.537*** 0.659* 5.479***  
(0.331) (0.305) (0.363) (1.188) 
St. Louis 1.034*** 0.511** 2.498*** −2.225  
(0.308) (0.199) (0.428) (2.031) 
San Diego 3.177*** 0.336* 0.340*** 5.808***  
(0.565) (0.198) (0.106) (1.935) 
San Jose 3.783*** −0.751 2.011*** 5.383***  
(0.432) (0.480) (0.175) (0.241) 
Seattle 1.592*** 1.642*** 0.056 3.110***  
(0.535) (0.197) (0.106) (0.377) 
Tampa −0.725** −0.749 1.419*** 0.767***  
(0.312) (0.524) (0.296) (0.211) 
Washington 3.035*** 2.798*** −0.243** 2.505***  
(0.167) (0.372) (0.119) (0.289) 
This specification is estimated separately for each metropolitan area. This specification includes EA (a sector 
specific employment for office, industrial, and flex property types and retail sales for the retail property 
type), s (a sector specific stock of space office, industrial, and flex property types) and a constant as explanatory 
variables for each metropolitan area and property type. Standard errors statistics appear in parenthesis. 
*p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, ***p = 0.01 
 
We should expect that in locations where it is difficult to build, demand effects on rents may be different than in 
places where it is easier to build. Saiz (2010) reports the fraction of land in the metropolitan area that is not 
available for development and finds that it is an important part of housing supply elasticity. Saiz (2010) also 
reports the Wharton Regulatory Index which reflects regulatory constraints on building housing.Footnote16 The 
correlation between the estimated coefficient for lnEA in the long run results and the fraction of land that is 
unavailable or the regulatory index is, respectively, for office property 0.15 and 0.21, for retail property 0.13 and 
0.16, for industrial property −0.08 and −0.36, and for flex property 0.43 and −0.02. Therefore, in the long run, for 
office, retail, and flex property types, locations with less available land have larger increases in rents in response 
to more demand. The results for the regulatory index are more mixed and likely reflect measurement error in 
the index for commercial property. 
In Table 8 the coefficient for the impact of space is reported. For example, for office space the supply of space 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on rents in the long run for 22 of the areas, but for 3 areas 
there is a positive and statistically significant impact. For at least office space, the de-pooled long run results are 
more consistent and meet expectations for supply. Unfortunately, the opposite is true for retail, industrial, and 
flex property. For retail, industrial, and flex property the ratios of negative to positive impacts are 4/24, 5/19, 
12/7. 
Table 8 Results for supply (ln s), long-run model, by metropolitan area 
Metropolitan area Office Retail Industrial Flex 
Atlanta 0.076 0.561*** 0.233*** 0.800  
(0.233) (0.115) (0.063) (0.594) 
Austin −1.056 0.709*** −0.668 0.386  
(0.983) (0.096) (0.504) (1.157) 
Baltimore −1.645*** 4.198*** 1.838*** −1.610***  
(0.195) (0.314) (0.341) (0.523) 
Charlotte −1.330*** 1.567*** 6.305*** −3.770***  
(0.270) (0.248) (0.739) (0.452) 
Chicago −1.750*** −1.047*** 1.144** 1.041***  
(0.265) (0.269) (0.433) (0.212) 
Cincinnati −3.425*** 2.838*** 1.696*** 0.690  
(0.458) (0.515) (0.569) (0.454) 
Cleveland −4.134*** 1.382*** −6.684*** −0.939  
(0.498) (0.212) (1.140) (1.510) 
Columbus −0.770*** 0.948* 0.660 −1.006***  
(0.191) (0.511) (0.568) (0.311) 
Dallas −3.718*** −1.992*** −0.076 −2.458***  
(0.206) (0.362) (0.230) (0.648) 
Denver – – −2.004** −1.726***  
    (0.746) (0.205) 
Detroit −3.040*** 3.297*** −2.023 0.201  
(0.173) (0.541) (1.264) (0.549) 
Houston −2.420*** 1.508*** −2.131** 5.363***  
(0.681) (0.247) (0.804) (0.420) 
Indianapolis −1.126 0.141 −0.112 2.444  
(0.838) (0.154) (0.782) (2.053) 
Jacksonville −0.488*** 6.268*** 2.703*** −0.019  
(0.135) (0.841) (0.350) (0.949) 
Kansas City −3.237*** 1.303*** −0.298 −1.248***  
(0.258) (0.251) (1.586) (0.191) 
Los Angeles −2.035*** 5.103*** 2.942*** 0.783**  
(0.491) (0.293) (0.475) (0.336) 
Memphis −0.374 −0.719*** −1.109*** 3.451***  
(0.281) (0.228) (0.242) (1.033) 
Miami 1.140*** 2.051*** 2.836*** −0.796  
(0.303) (0.278) (0.625) (0.635) 
Nashville 1.523*** −0.410* 2.438*** −1.917  
(0.456) (0.207) (0.835) (1.235) 
New York −9.398*** – 17.370*** 0.394  
(1.064)   (1.848) (1.557) 
Orlando −0.322 1.536*** 1.261*** −3.972***  
(0.281) (0.199) (0.156) (0.583) 
Philadelphia −2.114** 3.039*** 1.948 4.516***  
(0.953) (0.550) (1.173) (0.891) 
Phoenix −0.694*** 0.961*** 0.022 −0.567***  
(0.232) (0.137) (0.227) (0.200) 
Pittsburgh −2.307*** 0.489 −4.451*** 3.290***  
(0.382) (0.348) (1.361) (0.654) 
Portland 1.237 1.259*** 1.705*** 2.887  
(0.902) (0.220) (0.283) (1.881) 
Raleigh 0.759** 0.879*** 0.622* −1.780**  
(0.342) (0.290) (0.331) (0.680) 
Riverside 0.059 1.315*** −0.078 0.537  
(0.126) (0.143) (0.086) (0.397) 
Sacramento −0.526** 1.584*** 2.749*** −3.120***  
(0.228) (0.215) (0.674) (0.853) 
St. Louis −4.270*** 0.145 5.038*** 0.285  
(0.385) (0.138) (1.165) (0.375) 
San Diego −1.349*** 3.120*** 1.325*** −1.554  
(0.325) (0.767) (0.252) (1.192) 
San Jose −2.742*** −5.762*** 20.742*** 1.230**  
(0.373) (1.002) (3.997) (0.502) 
Seattle −1.582 3.068*** −0.063 −1.618*  
(1.108) (0.181) (0.184) (0.856) 
Tampa 0.641** 1.938*** 3.499*** 0.228  
(0.284) (0.384) (0.778) (0.338) 
Washington −2.815*** 4.025*** 0.775*** −1.290***  
(0.180) (0.419) (0.114) (0.267) 
This specification is estimated separately for each metropolitan area. This specification includes EA (a sector 
specific employment for office, industrial, and flex property types and retail sales for the retail property 
type), s (a sector specific stock of space office, industrial, and flex property types) and a constant as explanatory 
variables for each metropolitan area and property type. Standard errors statistics appear in parenthesis. 
*p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, ***p = 0.01 
Space Quality 
Another potential explanation for the heterogeneity of the long run results could lie in quality segments of the 
property that the data covers. In fact, the prior literature has focused on top quality property. There are some 
reasons to expect that property markets may be segmented in terms of demand and supply across quality 
spectrums. Consider the office market. Demand for the best office building will be derived from lawyers, 
accountants, financial analysts, consultants, and other high value added professionals who sell their intellectual 
capital. These types of spaces and buildings tend to be concentrated in downtown areas. Demand for lower 
quality space and buildings will be derived from back office activity such as processing, payroll, and more 
routinized activity with a lower value added component. These types of spaces tend to be dispersed in more 
suburban locations. Therefore, demand for space is highly segmented. In addition, the supply of space is also 
segmented by location and it is expensive to upgrade a low quality space into a high quality space. 
The quality of each property is proxied by grades assigned by the brokers and confirmed by Costar. Therefore, 
they represent the market’s distinction of overall quality, which will reflect many different inputs. For example, a 
grade A office building will likely be multiple stories with a staffed lobby, concierge service, underground 
parking, and retail on the first floor. A grade B building could be in an office park and well maintained, but with 
many fewer amenities. 
The long run model is rerun for each property grade and each metropolitan area. In general, the results are 
improved. For example, for class A office property statistically significant positive coefficients are found for 
economic activity in 12 metropolitan areas and statistically significant negative coefficients in 9 metropolitan 
areas. For industrial and flex property the ratios of statistically significant positive to negative impacts are 13/6 
and 16/7.Footnote17 These do not show much improvement over the results using all property grades. The results 
for supply do improve. The ratios of statistically negative coefficients to positive coefficients for office, industrial 
and flex are 22/2, 13/6, and 12/7.Footnote18 While the precision is still low, the ratios do indicate that for the 
majority of the locations the expected impact of supply is found.Footnote19 
Speed of Adjustment: Metropolitan Area Specific Error 
Using the metropolitan area specific results from Tables 7 and 8, the errors are calculated and used to estimate 
the error correction process. The results are reported in Table 9. Similar to the prior estimates, economic activity 
has a positive impact on rents in the short run and the coefficients are marginally significant. Supply is also 
insignificant. However, the error correction is much faster relative to the pooled error results. For example, for 
office property, the speed of adjustment increases from 6% to 17%. There are similar increases in the speed of 
adjustment estimates for retail, industrial, and flex properties so that in two or three quarters rents have 
returned back to equilibrium. The fastest adjustment is found for industrial properties. The extent of persistence 
is also either positive and significant or insignificant. Again, the level of persistence is highest for office property 
but there is also some persistence for flex property. This result is more consistent with priors that rents for 
commercial property are fairly smooth and should not oscillate around equilibrium on a quarterly basis.Footnote20 
Table 9 Speed of adjustment—metropolitan area specific error u (t-1) 
  Office Retail Industrial Flex 
Short run model     
 Constant −0.009*** 0.004* 0.000 0.002  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
 ∆ ln(EA) 0.410* 0.390* 0.547 0.676  
(0.211) (0.194) (0.390) (0.689) 
 ∆ ln(s) 0.337 0.033 −0.225 −0.137  
(0.241) (0.316) (0.334) (0.381) 
 u (t-1) −0.170*** −0.278*** −0.478*** −0.352***  
(0.038) (0.039) (0.047) (0.035) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1) 0.225*** −0.006 0.024 0.122**  
(0.035) (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) 
 R 2 -adj 0.227 0.125 0.240 0.188 
 N 1277 1015 1364 1358 
 Wooldridge 200.234 213.992 37.696 62.993 
The long run model results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. All models are measured including a constant term 
and binary variables for each metropolitan area (estimated coefficients not shown), omitting Atlanta-Sandy 
Springs-Marriett, GA. The dependent variable is ∆ln(R). R stands for real rent, EA is sector specific employment 
for office, industrial, and flex property types and retail sales for the retail property type and s is the sector 
specific stock of space. N is the number of observations. Wooldridge is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
in panel data. In all cases, the p-value is 0.000, so the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected. 
Robust standard error (adjusted for clusters in CBSA) statistics appear in parenthesis. *p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, 
***p = 0.01 
 
Table 10 examines the speed of adjustment by property quality or grade. Across all property types the speed, u t-
1, of adjustment back to equilibrium tends to be higher within a quality grade than across all quality grades, 
especially for grade A properties. For example, for grade A office space the adjustment back to equilibrium is 
70.5% while for all office space it was 17%. For grade A industrial space, the speed of adjustment is 59.3 and, for 
all grades together, it is 47.8%. Since rents move very quickly back to equilibrium within grade, this set of results 
is consistent with market segmentation. All the quality controlled results also show modest levels of persistence 
that is statistically significant for 7 of the 8 estimates. These results (more persistence and faster speed of 
adjustment) and the fact that average asking rents are more constant quality when building grade is controlled 
for, makes these set of results our preferred results. 
Table 10 Results for speed of adjustment by quality grade 
  Grade A Grade B Grade C 
I. Office    
 ∆ ln(EA) −1.306** −0.344 0.481  
(0.506) (0.445) (0.768) 
 ∆ ln(s) 0.108 0.048 0.694  
(0.343) (0.915) (1.049) 
 u(t-1) −0.705*** −0.589*** −0.427**  
(0.191) (0.190) (0.193) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1) 0.090*** 0.111*** 0.101***  
(0.012) (0.008) (0.013) 
 R 2 -adj 0.611 0.525 0.310 
 N 1373 1383 1386 
 Wooldridge 142.513 666.012 504.359 
II. Industrial    
 ∆ ln(EA) −0.504 0.494 0.233  
(0.614) (0.294) (0.303) 
 ∆ ln(s) −0.177 0.430 0.235  
(0.121) (0.279) (0.959) 
 u(t-1) −0.593*** −0.546*** −0.419***  
(0.102) (0.059) (0.037) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1) 0.126* 0.000 0.134***  
(0.074) (0.052) (0.047) 
 R 2 -adj 0.265 0.525 0.203 
 N 1100 1379 1375 
 Wooldridge 46.788 25.877 67.001 
III. Flex    
 ∆ ln(EA)   0.735 0.275  
  (0.515) (0.947) 
 ∆ ln(s)   0.029 1.201  
  (0.263) (1.345) 
 u(t-1)   −0.345*** −0.426***  
  (0.028) (0.04) 
 ∆ ln(R) (t-1)   0.165*** 0.132**  
  (0.032) (0.054) 
 R 2 -adj   0.185 0.230 
 N   1377 1364 
 Wooldridge   250.112 29.480 
The long run results are not reported (to save some space) but are available on request from the authors. The 
dependent variable is ∆ln(R). All models are measured include metropolitan area fixed effects (estimated 
coefficients not shown). R stands for real rent, EA is sector specific employment for office, industrial, and flex 
property types and retail sales for the retail property type, and s is the sector specific stock of space. u (t-1) is the 
lagged positive residual from the long run results for each metropolitan area. N is the number of quarterly 
observations. Wooldridge is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data. In all cases, the p-value is 
0.0000, so the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is strongly rejected. Robust standard error (adjusted for 
clusters in CBSA) statistics appear in parenthesis. *p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, ***p = 0.01 
Various Specification Tests 
The London Effect Hendershott et al. (2002b) coined the term “the London effect” to express a belief that large 
cities may react differently to demand and supply shocks. To test for this effect we identify the five largest 
metropolitan areas in our sample: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dallas, and Philadelphia. We refer to these 
locations as the Big 5 Metros, B5M. Our de-pooled long run results are consistent with office property results of 
Brounen and Jennen (2009b) and Hendershott, MacGregor, and White (2002b)—the effect of economic activity 
and supply is larger for very large cities. A simple correlation between city rank and the coefficient was of the 
anticipated direction (negative for EA and positive for s) and over 0.35 in absolute value in both instances. 
However, these relationships were not found for other property types. 
In the short run model B5M is interacted with economic activity and space. Therefore, the coefficients are 
additive for the largest areas. The results, as set forth in panel I of Table 11, show that in the short run large 
metropolitan area rents do not act very differently than in small and medium sized metropolitan areas. There 
are two exceptions: one, there is evidence of a slower speed of adjustment and a stronger demand effect for 
office property; two, we found a stronger supply effect for retail property. 
Table 11 Summary of speed of adjustment specification tests 
  Office Retail Industrial Flex 
I. The Five Largest Metropolitan Areas     
 u (t-1) −0.180*** −0.292*** −0.486*** −0.351***  
(0.041) (0.039) (0.049) (0.023) 
 B5M * ∆ ln(EA) 1.265* −0.796 −0.166 −1.112  
(0.651) (0.494) (0.258) (1.393) 
 B5M * ∆ ln(s) −0.617 −1.915*** 0.379 2.833 
 
(0.456) (0.591) (0.445) (2.331) 
 B5M * u (t-1) 0.094** 0.046 0.105 −0.006  
(0.045) (0.102) (0.070) (0.087) 
 B5M * ∆ ln(R) (t-1) −0.052 0.126 0.050 −0.126  
(0.051) (0.080) (0.088) (0.144) 
II. Positive Disequilibrium     
 u(t-1) −0.132*** −0.384*** −0.305*** −0.350***  
(0.029) (0.087) (0.074) (0.045) 
 [(ut-1 > 0) * ut-1] −0.075* 0.204 −0.300*** −0.003  
(0.039) (0.182) (0.087) (0.074) 
III. Positive Disequilibrium with Interactions     
 u(t-1) −0.189*** −0.299*** −0.530*** 0.135**  
(0.039) (0.049) (0.061) (0.056) 
 [(ut-1 > 0) * ∆ ln(EA)t] 0.599 −0.335 −0.425** −0.649  
(0.397) (0.309) (0.204) (0.564) 
 [(ut-1 > 0) * ∆ ln(s)t] 0.018 1.252 1.732** −0.003  
(0.376) (0.803) (0.838) (0.004) 
IV. Large Disequilibrium     
 u(t-1) −0.171*** −0.197*** −0.234*** −0.237***  
(0.033) (0.066) (0.043) (0.031) 
 [(Big ut-1) * ut-1] 0.001 −0.099 −0.312*** −0.142***  
(0.059) (0.068) (0.061) (0.049) 
V. Large Disequilibrium with Interactions     
 u(t-1) −0.183*** −0.252*** −0.413*** −0.307***  
(0.020) (0.041) (0.04) (0.041) 
 [(Big u) (t-1) * ∆ ln(EA)t] 6.404* −5.87*** 1.923 −1.522  
(3.246) (1.715) (2.664) (4.814) 
 [(Big u) (t-1) * ∆ ln(s)t] −2.727 −1.275 −16.977* −11.281**  
(2.783) (4.732) (8.695) (5.114) 
This table summarized key results for different specification test of the short run model. In each case the same 
long run model results are used as reported in Tables 7 and 8. The dependent variable is ln(R) and ∆ln(R) for long 
and short run models, respectively, where R stands for real rent. Although not reported to save space, each 
short run specification includes ∆lnEA, sector specific economic activity and ∆lns, sector specific stock of space, 
and ∆ ln(R) t-1, the lagged change in real rents, and metropolitan area fixed effects. B5M is one if the 
metropolitan area is one of the top five in terms of 2000 population (i.e., NY-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, 
LA-Long Beach-Santa Ana, Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, Dallas, or Philadelphia), and zero otherwise. u (t-1)   > 0 is the 
lagged positive residual, which is equal to one if the lagged residual (error correction term) is positive, and is 
equal to zero otherwise. Big(u) is an indicator of a big error, which equals one if the residual deviates from the 
mean by one or more standard deviations, and zero otherwise. Robust standard error (adjusted for clusters in 
CBSA) statistics appear in parenthesis. *p = 0.10, **p = 0.05, ***p = 0.01 
Speed of Adjustment: The Direction and Size of the Disequilibrium 
There may also be heterogeneity in how a metropolitan area moves back to equilibrium. Panels II and III of 
Table 11 ask, if rents are too high relative to the equilibrium level, do they move back to equilibrium faster or 
slower? Panel IV asks, if rents are a long distance from equilibrium (a big disequilibrium), does the market adjust 
more quickly or slowly than in typical periods of disequilibrium? The long run results are not reported because 
they are identical to those in Tables 7 and 8 as discussed in the section De-Pooling the Long Run Model. 
To test for the impact of the direction of the disequilibrium, a dummy variable is created that indicates when the 
error from the long run model is positive, u t-1 > 0, and is interacted with the long run error, u t-1, to create the 
variable (u t-1 > 0)*u t-1. Therefore, the error correction coefficient is additive for time periods when the rents are 
above equilibrium (rents are too high). The results indicate that for office property there is an error correction of 
13.2% for negative deviations and an error correction of 20.7% for positive deviations. This indicates that office 
rents may be stickier up than down. The same pattern is found for industrial space. For retail and flex space no 
asymmetry is found. In panel III, the results provide no consistent support for the notion that changes in 
demand or supply have differential impacts depending on whether rents are too high or too low. 
If rents deviate substantially from equilibrium, the market may react more strongly and move rents back to 
equilibrium at a quicker pace. To test for this impact, a variable called (Big u)t-1 is created. (Big u)t-1 equals one 
when u t-1 is more than one standard deviation from the mean of u t-1, which is zero. Therefore, the coefficient 
on [(Big u)t-1* u t-1] is additive to u t-1 for large deviations from equilibrium. In panel IV, the sign on [(Big u)t-1*u t-1] 
is negative and statistically significant for industrial and flex properties. Therefore, there is some support for the 
hypothesis that larger deviations from equilibrium will lead to a faster return to equilibrium. Panel V asks 
whether supply or demand changes have different impacts if rents are a long way from equilibrium. The 
interaction of a big error and supply, [(Big u)t-1* ∆ln(s)t], is negative for all property types and statistically 
significant for industrial and flex properties, providing some support for the notion that supply changes are more 
important when the rental market is very far from equilibrium. The interaction of a big error and economic 
activity, [(Big u)t-1*∆ln(EA)t], is inconsistent across the property types. Footnote21 
Conclusion 
Empirical studies of rent dynamics have been hampered by the lack of available data for long time series, for 
large cross sections, and for certain property types. Most of the prior literature has examined only a few large 
cities in Europe and the US. In addition, most research has been limited to the office and occasionally the retail 
sectors. In this paper, we provide evidence on real rent dynamics in 34 metropolitan areas in the US and on 
office, retail, industrial, and flex space in a unified framework and consistent data source, Costar, covering at 
most the second quarter of 1990 through the second quarter of 2009. 
The results indicate that while there are many similarities in how different property types respond to economic 
activity and the supply/availability of space, there is substantial heterogeneity in long run and short run 
dynamics. Various tests are conducted to identify potential causes of the heterogeneity. For example, in the long 
run rents in metropolitan areas with less land available for development are more responsive to demand 
conditions. Rents also tend to be higher when lending conditions tight. This presumable reflects tougher debt 
coverage ratio requirements (net operating income/debt service) for refinancing. In addition, in the long run, the 
impact of supply is more consistent for higher quality property types. 
In the short run dynamics portion of the results we find that the office market is the slowest to return to 
equilibrium at a rate of approximately 17% per quarter. Retail, industrial, and flex space markets move quickly 
back to equilibrium at rates of 28 to 48% per quarter. Therefore, after deviating from the long run equilibrium, 
and taking into consideration compounding, we should expect industrial property to be at long run equilibrium 
in less than 2 quarters, flex and retail property in less than 3 quarters, and office property in less than 5 quarters. 
However, the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium is much faster within a specific quality-property type 
than when considering the whole market for the property type. This impact is most profound for office property 
where the speed of adjustment increases from 17.0 to 70.5% per quarter depending on the specification. 
Additional heterogeneity is found when considering the direction and size of the disequilibrium. For example, 
when rents are very far from equilibrium, changes in supply tend to have a larger impact on rents in the short 
run. There is also some evidence that when the disequilibrium is very large the market approaches equilibrium 
more quickly, regardless of the direction of the error. In addition, in the office and industrial space markets, 
there is evidence that rents move more quickly down than up when out of equilibrium. This likely reflects the 
ability of renters to renegotiate when market rents decline below existing contract rents and the inability of 
landlords to renegotiate when market rents are above existing contract rents. 
Notes 
1. For many of the metropolitan areas the data does not start until later. On average the first year with data is 
1999 for office, industrial and flex property and 2001 for retail property. The last quarter with data is 
always the second quarter of 2009. 
2. Commercial property rents have also been studied at a micro or property level using either a hedonic or 
repeat sales framework (Wheaton et al. 2009; Jennen and Brounen 2009; Slade 2000; Munneke and 
Slade 2000, 2001) and in a structural and stock adjustment framework (Benjamin et al. 1998; Wheaton 
et al. 1997). 
3. The TWR rent index is estimated from a hedonic model using transactions from CB Commercial. The hedonic 
model controls for size of the building, length of the lease, height of the building, if it is a new building, 
and if the lease is a gross lease. These rents could reasonably be described as more constant quality 
than a simple average, which is what the Costar data provides. Conventions in space and across property 
type lead to fairly homogeneous lease types, at least on average. However, the Costar rents may be 
biased upward if the quality of the property is increasing over time or biased downward if the property 
quality is decreasing over time. These biases should lead to a more noisy measure of rental rate growth 
patterns. 
4. Over our sample period and metropolitan areas, the percentage of space available for rent that is being 
marketed as sublet space is on average 8.4% for office property, 3.4% for retail property, 5.2% for 
industrial property, and 6.6% for flex property. 
5. This Hendershott and coauthors error-correction formulation is somewhat different from the classic ECM but 
it is typical of the empirical literature on commercial property rent dynamics and asymmetric price 
adjustment. Error correction has been applied in many studies to real estate (Miller et al. 2011) 
consumption (Lewis 2011; Borenstein et al. 1997; Davidson et al. 1978), macroeconomics and financial 
markets (Garratt et al. 2003; Lastrapes and McMillin 2004) and strategic interactions among firms 
(Gilligan and Sarkar 1998). 
6. Office employment is calculated from the following 2002 North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) and downloaded from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics web site: 50510000 Information, 
55520000 Finance and Insurance, 55530000 Real Estate and Rental and Leasing, 60540000 Professional, 
Scientific, and Technical Services, 60550000 Management of Companies and Enterprises, 60560000 
Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services, 65610000 Educational 
Services, 65620000 Health Care and Social Assistance, 90000000 Government. Retail employment 
corresponds to 42000000 Retail Trade. Industrial employment is the addition of 30000000 
Manufacturing and 43493000 Warehousing and Storage. Finally, flexible-space employment is estimated 
as office plus industrial employment. 
7. Specification tests were also conducted using the Monthly Wholesale Trade Survey, and the Manufacturers' 
Shipments, Inventories, and Orders Survey to proxy for output in office, industrial, and flex property 
using businesses. However, the results were often counter intuitive and very sensitive to the 
specification. Therefore, they have not been reported in the paper. 
8. NNN indicates that the tenant pays the operating expenses. Full service or gross rents indicate that the 
landlord pays the operating expenses. In practice, many gross leases are modified so the tenant and 
landlord share the expenses. Some net lease rates, especially in retail, increase as the tenant sells more 
(percentage leases). 
9. Changes in the rental rate may or may not be explicitly defined in the lease. For example, a rent schedule can 
indicate step ups in rents for the full term of the lease on specific dates (usually every year). 
Alternatively, rents could be indexed to a cost of living index such as the Consumer Price Index. Rents 
could even depend on how much the tenant sells, with the rent defined in part as a percentage of the 
sales (percentage rents). 
10. Concessions can be used to ease moving costs, strategically time cash flows, or enhance the value of private 
information in a thin market. Typically the asking rent is publicly known while concessions are not, 
perhaps to improve the landlord’s bargaining positions. 
11. We would like to thank William Wheaton for providing us with the national TWR rent series. 
12. This may also due to other factors such as market coverage in space and the quality of the space. 
13. The excluded metropolitan area is Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marriett, GA. 
14. There is a possibility that the cointegration is conditional on unobserved non-stationary factors such as 
increased use of on-line shopping, increased offshoring of manufacturing, and increased outsourcing of 
service jobs that would occupy office space. These factors could lead to dynamic changes to the 
underlying equilibrium. Unfortunately, the relatively short time series does not allow us to test this 
potential issue. However, we note that Fig. 1 does not show any downward trend in real rents. 
15. On average, the coefficient for economic activity and the standard error are 0.486 and 0.351 for office, 0.406 
and 0.288 for retail, 0.824 and 0.238 for industrial, and 0.807 and 0.933 for flex. On average, the 
coefficient for supply and the standard error are −1.613 and 0.427 for office, 1.416 and 0.334 for retail, 
1.769 and 0.733 for industrial, and −0.025 and 0.726 for flex. 
16. While regulations in housing markets is not the same as regulations in commercial property markets it may 
still function as a reasonable proxy for locations that tend to regulate more or less property markets. 
17. Retail property does not report grades. 
18. The long run results are not reported to save some space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
19. The availability of credit could also play a role in determining the long run rental rate. The long run model 
was rerun using the quarterly Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank 
Lending Practices. The variable included was the net percentage of banks tightening standards for 
commercial and industrial loans to large and middle-market firms. With this variable included the point 
estimates and precision of the results were similar. The impact of more banks tightening lending 
standards was associated with higher long run rents on the vast majority of metropolitan areas. This 
likely reflects the need of landlords to have better cash flows when trying to refinance or rollover 
mortgage debt due to higher debt coverage ratio requirements (cash flow/debt payment). The detailed 
results are available from the authors. 
20. It may be difficult to identify the equilibrium with few observations; therefore, the short run model was 
rerun using only areas with more than 40 observations. The results were qualitatively very similar to 
those reported in Table 9. The effect of EA was slightly higher for all property types. The short run model 
was also rerun including a measure of the tightness of lending standards. The results are again very 
similar, but the speed of adjustment is a little faster, there is a little more persistence, and Δln(EA) is a 
little larger. In addition, for 3 of the 4 property types, the impact of more tight lending standards 
increased rents in the short run. 
21. Two additional specification tests were conducted. The first test lags EA and s and the second test weights 
each observation by the amount of space it represents. Both set of results are very similar to those 
presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
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